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  We consider two (symmetric) upstream firms producing 
independent goods that sell to consumers through symmetric retailers. 
The distinguishing feature of retailers is that they have a selling 
capacity, in the sense, that there is an upper limit in the total units of 
the two goods they can sell. For low enough capacity levels, we obtain 
that wholesale prices are increasing in the capacity and therefore we 
find cases where profits of retailers increase by restricting capacity. 
Keeping constant the industry selling capacity, we study the profitability 
of the merger of all retailers. For low capacity levels we obtain that 
wholesale prices increase with the merger and therefore the merger of 
retailers is not profitable. 
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 31I n t r o d u c t i o n
Buyer power can be deﬁned as the ability of retailers to obtain better deals from suppliers.
Lately, competition authorities have become suspicious about the ways retailers try to increase
their buyer power for their possible negative eﬀect on welfare. For example, Gabrielsen and
Sorgard (1999), Dana (2006), Inderst and Shaﬀer (2007a) and Fauli-Oller (2007) has shown that
retailers can obtain buyer power by restricting the number of goods they are selling. In this way,
retailers increase competition among suppliers and increase the rents they obtain. An obvious
negative eﬀect of this type of policy is that it reduces the variety of goods available to consumers.
However, one of the shortcomings of those papers is that they do not make explicit which
mechanism retailers use to commit to restrict the number of goods they want to sell. In this
paper, we take seriously this commitment problem and introduce as a key parameter the dimen-
sion of the shop of retailers. The dimension determines the total number of units of all goods
that the retailer can sell. Therefore the dimension of a shop refers to the selling capacity of
a retailer. Given a capacity, we pose the question whether retailers want to restrict its selling
capacity.
In the benchmark case, we consider two (symmetric) upstream ﬁrms producing independent
goods that sell to consumers through n symmetric retailers. For low enough capacity levels, we
obtain that wholesale prices are increasing in the capacity and therefore we ﬁnd cases where
proﬁts of retailers would increase by restricting capacity.
In the second part of the paper we contribute to the debate on the eﬀect of downstream
mergers over buyer power. Many diﬀerent reasons has been provided by the literature to explain
why size obtained through merger can allow retailers to obtain better deals from suppliers.
Greater size can allow retailers to break collusion among suppliers (Snyder, 1996), it may also
allow retailers to threaten suppliers to vertically integrate (Katz (1987); Inderst and Wey (2007b)
                                                              4 and in the case of convex costs can allow retailers to obtain advantages over suppliers, because
they compete less "on the margin" (Chipty and Snyder (1999).
Keeping constant the industry selling capacity, we compare the situation with one retailer
with the case with n symmetric retailers. In contrast to previous results, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect
of the merger on wholesale prices depends on the level of capacity. For low capacity levels we
obtain that wholesale prices increase with the merger and therefore the merger of retailers is not
proﬁtable. For high capacity levels, instead, wholesale prices decrease with the merger and the
merger is proﬁtable.
In the next Section, we study, given a level of capacity, the contracting game for the case of
linear wholesale prices. Then we study the proﬁtability of mergers to monopoly in the retailing
sector. In the third Section we study the eﬀect of selling capacity for the case of general supply
contracts. We obtain that a monopolist retailer ﬁnds proﬁtable to restrict strategically capacity.
Final comments put the paper to an end.
2M o d e l
Assume we have two producers (A and B). Producer A (B) produces good A (B). Goods A
and B are independent. Demand of good i (i=A,B)i sg i v e nb yPi = a − Qi,w h e r ePi and
Qi are respectively the price and the quantity sold of good i. I assume independent goods to
highlight the fact that the relationship between goods comes only from capacity constraints and
not from substitutability between goods on the demand side. Upstream ﬁrms sell the goods
through retailers. There are n retailers. Each retailer is denoted with a natural number from
1 to n. The distinguishing characteristic of each retailer is that it has a limited shelf space. In
particular, we assume that the total units of the two goods that she can sell is lower than X
n ,
where X is total selling capacity in the industry. In particular, if x
j
i denotes the quantity that






We analyze the following two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, producer i (i = A,B)c h o o s e si t s
wholesale price wi ≤ a. In the second stage, retailers compete à la Cournot taking into account





























When this constraint is satisﬁed we say that we are in Region 1.I f w e a r e n o t i n R e g i o n 1,

























































































≤ 0 (Region 2iii).
The four Regions are depicted in Figure 1:
 












Figure 1: Second stage equilibrium
2.2 First stage
















, this will still be the equilibrium of the present
game, because deviation proﬁts can not increase with the presence of selling capacity constraints.






. Observe that in Figure 1 this condition
was satisﬁed.
We analyze the optimal wholesale price of supplier A given wB. The previous picture gives us




wB <a ,b yi n c r e a s i n gwA from 0 we move from region 2ii, where retailers are constrained and
sell only good A, to Region 2i, where retailers are constrained but sell both goods and ﬁnally to
Region 1 where retailers are unconstrained.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the supplier A will never choose a wA such that it is in
the interior of Region 2ii. By increasing slightly price proﬁts will increase, because sales will8
                                                            7 remain constant1. She will never choose a wA such that it is in Region 2iii. In this way, she
sells nothing and can obtain sales reducing the price to Region 2i. Then we have to study the
optimal decisions in Regions 2i and Region 1.






) is not located in
Region 1. The equilibrium can not be in the frontier between Region 2i and 2ii, because then
producer B sells nothing and it can not be behaving optimally. Therefore the equilibrium must
lie in the interior of Region 2i or in the frontier between Region 2i and Region 1.2 This is
formalized in the next proposition:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium wholesale prices are given by w∗
A = w∗
B =










B = a −












As a reference, consider the situation where producers merge. Then it is very easy to derive
the optimal wholesale prices3.T h e m e r g e d ﬁrm will set the same wholesale price w∗ for each









w∗ = a −





In this case, wholesale prices decrease with capacity and increase with competition downstream.
Then wholesale prices are the same with competition and with monopoly upstream if selling
capacity is high. Competition has an eﬀect only when selling capacity is signiﬁcantly scarce.









. In this case, wholesale prices are increasing in capacity and decreasing























2The actual shape of the best response of producer A is in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Wholesale prices
in n. The reason for this result is that the elasticity of demand for the intermediate input is
higher the higher the competition in the downstream sector. The absolute value of the elasticity
of demand of retailers of good i in Region 2i is given by:
εi =
nwi





(n(−wi + wj)+( n + A)X)
B > 0 (1)
This means that the higher n t h em o r ep r o ﬁtable is to undercut the rival producer. This explains
that the equilibrium wholesale price decreases with n.
The following picture plots the wholesale price for n =1(normal line) and for a generic
n (thick line). The important thing to notice is that for X ≤
na
2n +1
, wholesale prices are
lower when there is competition downstream. This will be very important when we study the
proﬁtability of a merger to monopoly.










Figure 3: Industry proﬁts downstream
2.3 Downstream mergers



























2(n +1 ) 2 otherwise
The typical shape of the industry proﬁts downstream is presented4 in Figure 3 .
It is concave for low capacities, then increasing and ﬁnally constant when retailers are un-
constrained. The concave part reﬂects a trade-oﬀ. For low capacities, increasing capacity has
t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect on proﬁts of increasing sales but the negative eﬀect of increasing the wholesale
prices. The decreasing part of the function identiﬁes a region where retailers would be better-oﬀ
if they would agree to restrict capacity.
Next we study the proﬁtability of the merger of all downstream ﬁrms. A merger is said to be
proﬁtable if it increases the proﬁts of the downstream ﬁrms ( ΠD(1) > ΠD(n)). The merger has
4The picture corresponds to the case n =4and a =1 .
10t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of reducing competition only if capacity is high (X>a
2), because otherwise
ﬁr m ss e l lu pt oc a p a c i t yi na n ym a r k e ts t r u c t u r e .I fX>a
2, the merger is proﬁtable, because
it reduces competition and the wholesale prices do not increase with the merger. If X<a
2,t h e
merger will be proﬁtable if it reduces wholesale prices. Using Proposition 1, this will be the case




X. Next proposition states the result on proﬁtability.
Proposition 2 With competition upstream, the merger to monopoly of downstream ﬁr m si sn o t







It is very easy to ﬁnd the counterpart of proposition 2 for the case where producers merge.
As we have said before, the wholesale price is given by
w∗
A = w∗
























,t h em e r g e ri s
proﬁtable because it reduces wholesale prices. Next proposition summarizes.
Proposition 3 Without competition upstream, the merger to monopoly of downstream ﬁrms is
always proﬁtable.
Putting together propositions 2 and 3, we obtain that the merger of the upstream ﬁrms
stimulates the merger of downstream ﬁrms. This is coherent with the empirical fact that parallel
processes of consolidation in both upstream and downstream sectors are observed.
3 General supply contracts
In this Section, we study the eﬀect of constraints on the selling capacity when supply contracts
are general. We focus on the case of a monopolist retailer to be able to import results from
11Bernheim and Whinston (1998). Their main focus is on exclusive contracts, but to know their
eﬀect they also study the situation where they are n o tp o s s i b l e .T h i si st h ec a s ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e d
in. To generalize the model to n retailers is far from obvious and it is left for future research.
We consider that selling capacity is X<aand study the following contracting game. In
the ﬁrst stage, producers (A and B)o ﬀer supply contracts Pi(xi) (i = A,B). Each contract is
a function that maps the sales of good i xi to a monetary payment. In the second stage, the
retailer decides whether to accept the contract or not. In the third stage, the retailer chooses
the level of sales. The timing again is the same as in Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
Before stating the equilibrium, we introduce the following deﬁnitions. Given sales (xA,x B),
total industry proﬁts are given by:
R(xA,x B)=( a − xA)xA +( a − xB)xB.
We have that
(x∗,x ∗)= argmax





























Observe that symmetry implies that y∗ = z∗.
Then the maximal proﬁts at the industry level are Π = R(x∗,x ∗) and the maximal proﬁts
if the retailer can only trade with producer i is Πi = R(y∗,0) = R(0,z∗). Observe that X<a
implies that
Π < ΠA + ΠB
12that is Assumption B2 in Bernheim and Whinston (1998)5. Then, we rewrite Proposition B in
Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
Proposition 4 (Proposition 2 Bernheim and Whinston (1998)) There is an equilibrium of the
contracting game in which the retailer accepts both manufacturer’s contracts and chooses (x∗,x ∗).
The payoﬀ of the retailer is ΠA +ΠB −Π. Furthermore, this equilibrium weakly dominates (for
the manufacturer) any other equilibrium of this game.
The payoﬀ of the retailer is given by:





















holds that by making shelve space scarce, the retailer can increase the rents obtained from the
vertical structure. Next proposition summarizes.
Proposition 5 Assume that the retailer can choose the selling capacity at no cost before the





4C o n c l u s i o n
In the present paper, we have explicitly modelled the dimension of retailers. This has shed light
on its possible strategic use vis-à-vis suppliers. We have showed that by restricting capacity
retailers increase the competition of suppliers for the scarce shelving space. Suppliers react to it
by lowering their wholesale prices. Furthermore, we have showed that when industry capacity
5Observe that in our case Assumption B1 in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) holds with equality. Footnote 12
in the paper clariﬁes that in this case all the results still hold.
13is low and retailers are constrained, mergers increase wholesale prices. The reason is that the
demand of suppliers become more elastic as competition downstream increases.
In future work, I would like to study the strategic choice of selling capacity in oligopoly.
The optimal capacity will be the result of the balance of two eﬀects: on the one hand, reducing
capacity reduces wholesale prices and, on the other hand, increasing capacity increases sales. If
we assume that suppliers can not price discriminate and therefore price concessions are granted
to any retailer, we can easily conclude that the noncooperative eﬀort to reduce wholesale prices
will be lower than the one that maximizes retailers proﬁts. This will result in the capacity level
be higher than the one that maximizes retailers proﬁts.
This can be connected with the existing laws in diﬀerent countries that impose legal limits
to the creation of new selling capacity. For example, in France, la Loi Raﬀarin impose legal
requirements that result in delays in the enlargement and creation of shopping centers. In
Spain, many regional governments, i.e. Catalonia, establish periods of time where no new big
supermarket can be created. Those laws are justiﬁed as a means of protecting small retailers.
However, they may have the side-eﬀect of increasing the proﬁts of incumbent big retailers at
the expense of suppliers.
145A p p e n d i x








½nwB +( n +1 ) X
2n
if 0 ≤ wB ≤
3(n +1 ) X
n
wB −
(n +1 ) X
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3(n +1 ) X
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(n +1 ) X
n
<w B ≤ a
Given X, this reaction function crosses the 45 degree line only once. This crossing point
determines the equilibrium in wholesale prices that is stated in proposition 1.
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